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  1Reporting of Internal Control Deficiencies, 




We examine the relationship between accuracy in management forecasts and the effectiveness 
of internal controls by using the unique setting in Japan, where disclosing management forecasts 
is effectively mandated. Feng et al. (2009) posit and find that managers of firms reporting 
internal control weaknesses under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) report less accurate earnings 
forecasts compared with other firms in the U.S., where management forecasts are disclosed 
voluntarily. In line with this notion, our results show that firms disclosing internal control 
deficiencies and those restating financial highlights report less accurate management forecasts 
in the Japanese market, where the disclosure of management forecasts are effectively mandated. 
Furthermore, we find that manager’s optimistic biases cause such inaccurate management 
forecasts. Our results indicate that the effectiveness of internal controls has a significant impact 
on internal reports, which are used in forming forecasts; therefore, internal control weaknesses 
induce less accurate management forecasts. 
 
1. Introduction 
This study investigates the relationship between the accuracy of management forecasts and the 
effectiveness of internal controls in the Japanese market. Although a number of studies have 
examined management forecasts and have clarified factors that influence the accuracy of 
forecasts, the effectiveness of internal controls has not been discussed as a factor that 
determines the accuracy of management forecasts. However, Feng et al. (2009) posit and find 
that firms with ineffective internal controls report less accurate management forecasts than 
  2others. Managers of firms with ineffective internal controls are likely to rely on erroneous 
internal management reports in forming forecast; therefore, their earnings forecasts might be 
less accurate than those of firms with effective internal controls. Following Feng et al. (2009), 
we regard firms disclosing internal control deficiencies (ICD) as firms with ineffective internal 
controls, since they report material weaknesses in internal control systems. This disclosure is 
required under the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law in Japan, which is parallel to the 
SOX in the U.S.   
  In addition to this disclosure, we also regard firms restating their financial highlights 
as firms with weak internal controls. Financial highlights are condensed financial statements 
publicized by Japanese firms in around 40 days after the fiscal year ends. This report is required 
by Japan’s stock exchange to ensure the timeliness of disclosure. Certainly, this disclosure is the 
earliest information of a firm’s performance for the market participants, and therefore it is likely 
to be very useful for revising their expectations. However, since financial highlights are 
disclosed soon after the accounts are settled and are approved by the board of directors, that is 
before the audit procedures are completed and before the annual shareholder’s meetings are held, 
they are likely to involve errors or fraud stemming from inaccurate internal management reports. 
Therefore, some managers ought to restate the released financial highlights when a significant 
difference is revealed between disclosed values and newly calculated values as audit procedures 
proceed. Therefore, we ascertain that the firms restating financial highlights are the firms that 
have weak internal controls. However, internal control weaknesses of such firms may be less 
severe than those disclosing ICD if they do not disclose ICD. Since the effectiveness of internal 
control weaknesses is essentially a question of degree, may be several firms that do not have 
internal control weaknesses sufficient to disclose ICD. Nevertheless, even if firms have any 
internal control weaknesses, they are likely to report more or less inaccurate management 
  3forecasts. Stated differently, firms restating their financial highlights might report less accurate 
management forecast than other firms because of their internal control weaknesses, even though 
they do not disclose ICD. We then investigate whether the accuracy of management forecasts 
disclosed by firms that restate is lower than those disclosed by firms that do not restate, in 
addition to conducting an analysis regarding the accuracy of management forecasts of firms 
with ICD. Simultaneously, we compare the accuracy of management forecasts of the firms that 
restate the released financial highlights with that of the firms with ICD.   
  Thus, our study is in line with the findings of Feng et al. (2009), while our view point 
is different from theirs in that we regard both firms, those reporting ICD and those restating 
financial highlights, as those with weak internal controls. Thereby, we contribute to a series of 
managers’ forecast examinations as well as to the prior literature concerning internal control 
reports and restatements. In addition, disclosure of management forecasts is effectively 
mandated in Japan; therefore, whether or not managers disclose earnings forecasts need not be 
controlled in this study, while it is required in studies examining other markets. When the 
market investigated has a voluntarily disclosure system of management forecasts, the analysis 
concerning the accuracy of management forecasts usually involves errors in controlling for the 
incentives of the disclosure itself. On the other hand, since we investigate the Japanese market, 
where disclosure of management forecasts is effectively mandated, it allows us to clarify the 
direct relationship between internal control weaknesses and the accuracy of management 
forecasts without controlling for any incentives to disclose the forecasts. Hence, this study has 
an advantage in assessing whether the effectiveness of internal controls influence the accuracy 
of management forecasts, and it provides new evidence.     
    Our results indicate that firms disclosing ICD and those restating financial highlights 
report less accurate management forecasts. This is consistent with the prediction that firms with 
  4weak internal controls report less accurate management forecasts. Furthermore, we find that a 
manager’s optimistic bias causes such inaccurate management forecasts. While managers are 
likely to report optimistically biased forecasts, internal control weaknesses may accelerate this 
tendency. Thus, we find that the accuracy of management forecasts is lower among firms with 
weak internal controls. Although firms that restate probably suffer somewhat less internal 
control weaknesses than firms that disclose ICD, the results show that the accuracy and the bias 
of management forecasts are indifferent between these two firms.   
  Our study makes the following contribution to the literature. We provide new evidence 
regarding the relationship between a manager’s forecast accuracy and internal control 
weaknesses in a market that has an effectively mandated disclosure system regarding 
managements’ forecasts. We also examine whether internal control weaknesses relate to 
opportunistic or pessimistic forecast biases, while Feng et al. (2009) do not. The results indicate 
that internal control weaknesses cause opportunistic biases of management forecasts. Since 
people use any information disclosed by firms for their investment decisions, inherent biases in 
such information are useful for them. Hence, our results contribute to market participants 
making better decisions about their investments. Moreover, we contribute to a series of audit 
research, as we utilize unaudited financial information disclosed by firms. The financial 
information that we use includes management forecasts and financial highlights, both of which 
are unaudited. Although control risk is well known as a component of material misstatement 
risk in the audit risk model, we usually cannot examine the possible direct effect of control risk 
on the misstatement of financial information, since financial information before an audit is 
generally inaccessible. Hence, the misstatements that we determine in audited financial 
statements are the ones that have not been detected through audit procedures. Therefore, the 
number of misstatements in those statements is likely to be much smaller than the number to 
  5which the control risks are actually related. In contrast, we utilize unaudited financial 
information disclosed by firms; therefore, this allows us to examine the direct effect of internal 
control weaknesses (control risk) on the misstatement of financial information. Thus, we 
contribute to the literature by revealing the possible effect of control risk on unaudited financial 
information. 
  This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review of 
management forecasts and Section 3 explains the setting in Japan. Section 4 describes the 
hypothesis and examination model for this study. The data and variables’ statistics are presented 
in Section 5, and Section 6 reports and explores the empirical results. Section 7 provides 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature Review   
Several previous studies have examined management earnings forecasts in the U.S. market. 
Hirst et al. (2008) provide a comprehensive review of management forecasts of U.S. firms, and 
they raise three perspectives from which prior studies have investigated. These are antecedents, 
characteristics, and consequences. The accuracy of management forecasts that we investigate in 
this study is one of the characteristics of management forecasts. A number of factors lead to 
management forecast errors. Cotter et al. (2006) and Matsumoto (2002) find that management 
utilizes earnings forecasts to guide the market expectations regarding future earnings in order to 
meet such expectations when they release actual earnings
1. In addition, Rogers and Stocken 
(2005) show that managers misrepresent their forward-looking information as the market’s 
ability to detect misrepresentations decreases. These results indicate that managers have several 
                                                           
1  On the other hand, Kasznik (1999) shows that managers are inclined to manage reported earnings 
toward their forecasts. His result implies that managers regard forecasted values that they make as a 
benchmark to either meet or beat.     
  6incentives or opportunities to report less accurate forecasts. However, tools exist to prevent 
managers from disclosing less accurate forecasts. Ajinkya et al. (2005) and Karamanou and 
Vafeas (2005) show that firms with better governance structures disclose more accurate 
management forecasts than others. Thus, previous research has been inclined to shed light on a 
manager’s incentives or deterrent mechanism against management’s opportunistic behavior in 
order to explore the determinant factors of errors in management forecasts.   
  On the other hand, Feng et al. (2009) investigate the influence of internal control 
efficiency on management earnings forecasts. Managers of firms with ineffective internal 
controls are likely to rely on erroneous internal management reports in forming forecasts; 
therefore, their earnings forecasts might be less accurate than those of firms with effective 
internal controls. Feng et al. (2009) show that the accuracy of management forecasts is lower 
among firms reporting ICD under Section 404 of SOX for U.S. companies. This result indicates 
that a manager’s earnings forecasts can be less accurate irrespective of manager’s incentives. 
Okuda and Suzuki (2009) also find that the creation of a department to monitor internal controls 
reduces errors in management earnings forecasts in the context of the Japanese market. This 
result implies that managers are able to utilize more accurate internal management reports when 
making forecasts, and therefore the made earnings forecasts are more accurate if a department is 
created to supervise internal control systems. These results support the notion that effective 
internal control systems improve the accuracy of management forecasts, while ineffective 
systems deteriorate it. 
 
3. The Japanese Setting 
3.1 Internal Control Reports in Japan 
The importance of companies’ internal controls has been recognized, especially in the U.S. soon 
  7after fraudulent behavior by firms such as Enron and World.com occurred. Since SOX was 
enacted in 2002, management of Securities and Exchange Commissions (SEC) registrants has 
been obligated to prepare the internal control report. Meanwhile, the environment surrounding 
the Japanese financial capital market has been changing drastically
2; therefore, an urgent need 
existed to (1) compile comprehensive and cross-sectional rules for user protection and develop 
an environment where users can invest with confidence, (2) enhance fairness and transparency 
as well as restore confidence in the market, and (3) enhance the attractiveness of the Japanese 
market as an international market. To respond to these needs, the bills to develop the legislative 
framework for the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law, which was amended from the 
Securities Exchange Law, were approved in the ordinary Diet session in June 2006 (Financial 
Service Agency (FSA), 2006). Enhancing disclosure requirements was one of the policies 
involved with the bills, and it included enhancing internal control system. The internal control 
reporting system was therefore enforced in September 2007 and was applicable from the 
business year beginning on or after April 1, 2008. In other words, Japanese firms have been 
disclosing an assessment of the validity of their internal controls over financial reporting since 
the fiscal year ending in March 2009. Thus, Japan was about six years behind the U.S. in 
implementing internal control report disclosure system. 
  The Japanese internal control report system was designed taking into account the 
criticism against the one originally introduced by the SOX in the U.S. (FSA, 2007) Stated 
differently, the FSA took measures to minimize the burden on listed companies in reporting the 
evaluation of internal control systems. According to FSA (2007, 2010), there are six differences 
                                                           
2  FSA (2006) provides three viewpoints to present a dramatic change in the Japanese environment. From 
the user’s viewpoint, although several financial technologies had been developed, regulations for user 
protection at that moment had not appeared. From the market’s perspective, it also insisted that a Japanese 
household’s financial assets should shift from savings to investments, since Japanese people mainly held 
financial assets in the form of cash and deposits. Finally, it presented that the Japanese market should 
enhance its attractiveness as an international market amid the globalization of financial and capital 
markets.    
  8between the laws in the U.S. and in Japan, which are as follows.   
 
(1) In determining the scope of internal control assessment, a top–down, risk-based approach 
has been adopted in Japan. This results in a narrower scope of internal control assessment 
relative to American firms. 
(2) The classification of internal control deficiencies is simplified. The U.S. has three levels of 
internal control deficiencies, including material weaknesses, significant deficiencies, and control 
deficiencies, while in Japan deficiencies are classified only into two levels, including material 
weaknesses and deficiencies in Japan. 
(3) Japanese auditors are required to solely audit the managerial assessment of internal controls, 
and they are not required to carry out the direct reporting that has been adopted in the U.S. 
Direct reporting implies that auditors directly audit and report on the effectiveness of internal 
controls. 
(4) Internal control audits are to be performed by the same auditors responsible for auditing a 
company’s financial statement in Japan, while the teams conducting the internal control audit 
and the financial statement audit are generally separated in the U.S. 
(5) The internal control audit report is prepared in conjunction with the report of financial 
statements audit in Japan, while these are allowed to be separately prepared in the U.S. 
(6) In Japan, auditors may contact the company’s personnel, such as corporate auditors
3 
(kansayaku), audit committees, or internal auditors in charge of supervising or monitoring 
operations of internal control when necessary. Such coordination is not explicitly specified in 
SOX. 
 
                                                           
3  Large Japanese companies employ two types of auditors: corporate auditors and independent auditors. 
For more details, see Matsumoto (1999) and Pong and Kita (2006). 
  9  Although details differ somewhat between these two countries, the basic concept 
regarding the evaluation of the effectiveness of internal controls is identical. However, the 
percentage of Japanese firms disclosing ICD and having fiscal year ending in March 2009 was 
about 2%
4, which is much lower than that of U.S. firms. According to prior studies, the ratio of 
U. S. firms disclosing ICD is at least more than 10% (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Doyle et al., 
2007). Such a low frequency of Japanese firms’ disclosure of ICD may be explained by the 
notion that companies attempt not to disclose material weaknesses to reduce the risk of being 
recognized as a company having “serious material weakness” (Yazawa, 2010). Alternatively, 
Japanese regulation might force management to have a higher threshold for disclosing material 
weaknesses in internal controls because of the FSA measures to minimize the burden on listed 
companies. For whatever reason, the low frequency of Japanese firms’ disclosure of ICD is 
distinctive.    
 
3.2 Management Forecasts in Japan       
  According to the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law, listed Japanese firms 
prepare and file annual securities report (Yuka Shoken Hokokusho). Since the reports include a 
variety of information, such as financial statements, detailed information on business activities, 
and corporate governance information, firms take time to prepare it. Hence, the report is 
publicly available about three months after a firm’s fiscal year ends. To fill the gap in the 
timeliness of information, listed Japanese firms are required by the stock exchange to disclose 
condensed financial statements (Kessan Tanshin) immediately after the financial statement 
accounts are settled (Kato et al., 2009; Ota, 2010). On average, it takes 40 days to disclose 
financial highlights, and this is the earliest information accessible to market participants. 
                                                           
4  In Japan, more than 70% of firms have March fiscal year ends.   
  10Although audits of financial statement have not been completed when financial highlights are 
publicized, the information involved in the report helps market participants revise their 
expectations in a timely manner.   
        Another distinctive feature of Japanese firms’ disclosure is that they provide next 
year’s forecast in parallel with realized values in the condensed report. Listed Japanese 
companies disclose estimated values of several accounts, such as sales, operating profit, 
ordinary profit (income before special items), net income, earnings per share, and dividends per 
share, as per the requirements of the stock exchange. Except for dividend information, 
management generally discloses point forecasts. Forecast disclosure is regarded as an 
effectively mandated rule in Japan, since the stock exchange strongly encourages managers of 
listed firms to provide forecasts. In Japan, more than 90% of listed firms disclose the following 
year’s forecast
5 (Kato et al., 2009).     
  In sum, the Japanese environment provides a unique setting to investigate the 
relationship between the effectiveness of internal controls and accuracy of management 
forecasts for the following two reasons. First, the percentage of firms disclosing ICD in March 
2009 was about 2%, much lower than that of U.S. firms under SOX. Second, management 
forecast disclosure is effectively mandated by Japan’s stock exchange, and such a system is 
unobserved in other countries, including the U.S. In short, the factors that exist at the time when 
a manager decides to issue a forecast need not be controlled while examining the Japanese 
environment. We examine the relationship between the effectiveness of internal controls and the 
accuracy of management forecasts by using this unique setting in Japan.   
 
                                                           
5  The TSE (Tokyo Stock Exchange) allows firms with high uncertainty about future prospects not to 
report management forecasts to prevent investors from making decisions on the basis of misleading 
information. However, the TSE requires even those firms to report management forecasts by the end of 
the fiscal year shortly after removing the uncertainty (TSE, 2006). 
  114. Hypothesis Development 
We basically follow Feng et al. (2009) to develop a hypothesis with regard to the relationship 
between the effectiveness of internal controls and management forecast errors. Weak internal 
controls will affect the financial inputs to management forecasts because some material 
weaknesses likely result in erroneous or incomplete internal management reports (Feng et al., 
2009). Accordingly, we posit that the accuracy of management forecasts is relatively lower 
among firms with ineffective internal controls compared with those with effective internal 
controls.    
  Weakness in internal controls is not likely to be a question of whether or not such 
controls exist, rather it is a question of the level of control. A material weakness in internal 
controls is defined as “a significant deficiency, or combination of significant deficiencies, that 
results in more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the annual or interim 
financial statements will not be prevented or detected (Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB), 2004).” However, there are at least two other levels of severity of internal 
control problems, which were identified by PCAOB (2004). These are control deficiency and 
significant deficiency, even though these deficiencies per se are not required to be disclosed in 
the U.S. (SEC, 2004) Likewise Japanese firms are required to disclose ICD only when their 
internal control systems are materially deficient. Regarding the relationship with the accuracy of 
management forecasts, firms with material weaknesses in internal controls are likely to have 
material forecast errors. Although firms are not obliged to disclose internal control deficiencies 
unless they are at the “material weakness” level, firms with any level of internal control 
deficiencies may report more or less inaccurate forecasts. If so, the distinction of whether or not 
material weaknesses are reported may not be enough to portray the relationship between the 
effectiveness of internal controls and management forecast errors. 
  12  Recent discussions about the effectiveness of internal controls are frequently linked to 
the filings regarding the internal control report under Section 302 or Section 404 of SOX. 
Ineffective internal controls are, however, sometimes highlighted as a determining factor of 
restatements (Kinney and McDaniel, 1989; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991), which are regarded 
as a problematic accounting practice. Effective internal control systems can possibly result in 
detecting and correcting unintentional errors before financial statements are released. Therefore, 
a high frequency of restatements may represent the ineffectiveness of a firm’s internal control 
systems. Indeed, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) find that prior restatements have a significant 
positive relationship with the reporting of internal control deficiencies.   
  To delineate the relationship between the effectiveness of internal controls and the 
accuracy of management forecasts in a broader way than done by Feng et al. (2009), we shed 
light on firms that restate their financial statements. The Japanese environment provides an 
interesting setting for examining this relationship. As discussed in Section 2.2, financial 
highlights disclosed by Japanese firms include forecasts as well as the values of accounts 
realized. Although realized values represent past accounting transactions and are unlikely to 
change after the release, financial highlights are publicized before the auditing procedure. 
Therefore, errors or fraud in financial highlights may be detected as auditors perform the 
procedure after the release. In addition, timeliness and reliability represent a trade-off 
relationship; therefore, timely information has a higher possibility of including unreliable 
information. Accordingly, some errors or fraud may be revealed in financial highlights after the 
release, and firms then need to restate them. However, firms that restate do not necessarily have 
sufficient ICD to be disclosed. Although the effectiveness of internal controls is a question of 
the level of effectiveness, ICD disclosure is required only when their deficiencies result in more 
than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of financial statements will not be 
  13prevented or detected. Hence, even firms that need not disclose ICD may well restate released 
financial information, as firms not disclosing ICD may still have internal control weaknesses. 
We then posit that firms that restate their financial highlights have more or less internal control 
weaknesses irrespective of ICD disclosure.   
  The Japanese stock exchange requires listed companies to disclose details of the 
amendment in released information immediately after they are revealed
6. We regard firms that 
publicize amendments to financial highlights as restatement firms, while this definition may be 
somewhat different from those used in previous studies
7. According to Table 2, 4.4% of listed 
firms restated disclosed financial information. The percentage is relatively higher than that of 
ICD firms (2.3%
8). In other words, even firms without material weaknesses in internal controls 
restate their financial highlights. These statistics indicate that there are several firms whose 
internal control systems are not deficient enough to report material weaknesses but are actually 
ineffective enough to restate released information. By incorporating the possible influence of 
restatement firms’ internal control weaknesses on management forecast errors in the analysis, 
we are able to investigate the influence of different levels of internal control weaknesses on 
management forecast errors. We then develop Model (1) to examine the relationship between 
internal control weaknesses and management forecast errors.   
 
) ( ) ( 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 NI SD DIST SIZE EQUITY LOSS RES ICD MFE Abs β β β β β β β α + + + + + + + =          
             ε β β β β + + + + + ) lagMFE ( Abs DIV _ GEO DIV _ IND GROW 11 10 9 8 ,     (1) 
 
                                                           
6  In amending financial highlights, whether such an amendment has a material impact on investors’ 
investment decisions is taken into account (TSE, 2010, Rule 405). 
7  Previous research generally specified restatement firms as firms that amended audited financial 
statements, while in this study, restatement firms are defined as firms amending condensed financial 
statements, which are unaudited.     
8  This percentage is a little higher than that of the entire set of listed firms that disclosed ICD because of 
the data requirements in this study. Details of the data requirements are explained in Section 4.   
  14  The definitions of the variables are presented in Table 1. The dependent variable, 
Abs(MFE) is higher (lower) if the management forecast is less (more) accurate. The variables 
examined in this study are ICD and RES, which are dummy variables for firms disclosing ICD 
and restating financial highlights, respectively. As we posit that firms having weak internal 
controls report less accurate management forecasts, the expected signs of the coefficient on ICD 
and RES are both positive.   
 
(Insert Table 1 around here) 
 
  To control for other determinants of the accuracy of management forecasts, we detect 
nine control variables following the prior literature, especially Ota (2006), who examined the 
determining factors of errors in management forecasts for Japanese firms. LOSS, EQUITY, SIZE, 
DIST
9, and GROW are controls for the influence of reporting losses, external financing, size, the 
degree of distress, and growth on the accuracy of management forecasts, respectively. These 
firm characteristics have been specified as the factors that induce managers to report biased 
forecasts. Moreover, innate variability and complexity in their operation are likely to make it 
difficult for managers to disclose accurate earnings forecasts. Therefore, SD(NI), IND_DIV, and 
GEO_DIV are controlled in Model (1). Prior studies present that management forecast errors are 
persistent. To control for this persistent effect from management forecast error, we add 
Abs(lagMFE) into the model. In addition to these variables, we control for the effect of industry 
on the accuracy of management forecasts, while industry dummies are not shown in Model (1) 
to avoid redundancy.     
 
                                                           
9  We follow Ohlson (1980) and Ota (2006) to estimate DIST. The details of score loading and score 
coefficients are described in Appendix. 
  155. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
5.1 Data 
The sample observations are listed Japanese firms having fiscal year end in March 2009. The 
listed Japanese firms are required to file the internal control report only after the fiscal year end 
in March 2009. Since our analysis needs realized earnings data to calculate the accuracy of 
management forecasts, we also use data from the fiscal year end in March 2010. Since we are 
accessible to such data until March 2010 fiscal year end, then we limit sample observations to 
firms having fiscal year ends in March 2009. Since certain control variables need data from 
previous periods to be calculated, then we went back to the data as necessary. We obtained 
sample firms’ financial data from Nikkei NEEDS Financial Quest, which covers realized 
financial data as well as management forecasts. We removed firms that did not have the required 
data to calculate the variables in Model (1), resulting in a sample of 2214 observations. To 
control for the possible effect of outliers on the results, the continuous variables SIZE, SD(NI), 
and GROW are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. Regarding abs(MFE) and abs(lagMFE), 
signed MFE and lagMFE are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles, and these absolute values 
are used in the empirical model estimations. 
 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics. As discussed in the previous section, the percentage 
of ICD firms and restatement firms is 2.3% and 4.4%, respectively. This indicates that the 
probability of firms restating financial highlights is higher than that of firms disclosing ICD. 
Regarding management signed forecast errors, its mean (median) value of –0.038 (0.001) 
implies that the average value is influenced by some firms reporting highly opportunistic 
earnings forecasts, while median firms reported earnings forecasts that fell slightly below the 
  16realized value in the next period. This negative mean value is comparable to that obtained by 
Kato et al. (2009), while their median value is negative. Sample period differences may cause 
this difference in the distribution of management forecast biases, since their sample period is 
from 1997 to 2006. 
 
(Table 2 is inserted around here) 
 
  Table 3 presents the correlation matrix. According to Table 3, the univariate 
relationship between Abs(MFE) and ICD is positive (0.14, 0.07), and it is consistent with our 
hypothesis. The relationship between Abs(MFE) and RES is also positive (0.13 and 0.10). These 
results support our expectation that firms with ineffective internal controls report less accurate 
earnings forecasts. Except for the correlations between LOSS and DIST of 0.53 and 0.59, the 
correlations do not pose any multicollinearity problems, while the VIF for all of the control 
variables is below 10. Therefore, our regression model is free of multicollinearity concerns.         
 
(Table 3 is inserted around here) 
 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 4 presents the result of the univariate analysis. We compare the accuracy of management 
forecasts between firms in two ways. The first is between ICD firms (firms that disclosed ICD) 
and non-ICD firms (firms that did not disclose ICD), and the second is between restatement 
firms (firms that restated financial highlights) and non-restatement firms (firms that did not 
restate financial highlights). Table 4 shows that the mean value of abs(MFE) is significantly 
  17higher for ICD firms than for non-ICD firms. The median value is also higher for ICD firms 
than for non-ICD firms at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). As is the case of a comparison between 
ICD firms and non-ICD firms, the mean and median values of abs(MFE) are significantly 
higher for restatement firms than for non-restatement firms at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). In 
keeping with the results of the correlation matrix, Table 4 shows that firms with ineffective 
internal controls report less accurate management forecasts compared with firms with effective 
internal controls. 
 
(Table 4 is inserted around here) 
 
6.2 Regression Results 
The results of the multivariate analysis are reported in Table 5. The coefficient on ICD is 0.097, 
which is significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed). This result indicates that Japanese firms 
disclosing ICD report less accurate management forecasts than other firms. The coefficient on 
RES (0.059) also has a positive and significant value at the 0.05 level (two-tailed), which 
supports our hypothesis. Since the severity of internal control weaknesses may differ between 
firms disclosing ICD and restatement firms, we conducted the analysis to test for the difference 
between the coefficients on ICD and RES. The result is stated in the last two rows of Table 4. 
According to the table, while the coefficient on ICD exceeds that on RES, the difference is not 
statistically significant. These results indicate that although both firms, those reporting ICD and 
restating financial highlights, reported less accurate management forecasts, the level of accuracy 
between them is statistically indifferent.   
 
(Table 5 is inserted around here) 
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    Regarding the results of the control variables, the coefficients on SIZE, DIST, GEO_DIV, 
and Abs(lagMFE) are statistically significant, and these have expected signs. While all of the 
independent variables are not statistically significant, the explanatory power of the model (adj. 
R
2) is approximately 0.29, which is the same or higher compared with other studies regarding 
Japanese firms (Ota 2006) and U.S. companies (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 
2005; Rogers and Stocken, 2005). Therefore, Model (1) is likely to specify the relevant factors 
that relate to the accuracy of management forecasts. 
 
6.3 Additional Analysis 
Although the difference between realized earnings and management forecasts has been 
frequently discussed in terms of accuracy, several studies have explored it in terms of bias (Hirst 
et al., 2008). To clarify whether the accuracy of management forecasts is induced by an 
optimistic or pessimistic bias, we separately reestimate Model (1) for firms having positive and 
negative management forecast errors. These analyses allow us to examine whether 
managements’ optimistic or pessimistic biases influence the results.   
  Prior literature shows that management forecasts generally reflect optimistic biases 
(Ajinkya et al., 2005; Kato et al., 2009; Rogers and Stocken, 2005). If management forecasts 
inherently involve optimistic biases, managers in firms with weak internal controls may report 
more optimistic forecasts. Without accurate internal management reports, firms’ managers ought 
to disclose their optimistic expectations if they are inherently optimistic in forming their 
forecasts. On the other hand, if firms with weak internal controls report less accurate 
management forecasts just because of the uncertainty about their future performance, 
management forecasts may be biased in both the optimistic and pessimistic directions. If the 
  19former explanation is valid, the coefficients on ICD and RES will be positive only while using 
firms with negative management forecast errors (opportunistic bias). In contrast, if the latter 
explanation is valid, the coefficients on ICD and RES will be positive both while using firms 
with negative management forecast errors and while using those with equal to or greater than 
zero management forecast errors. 
 
(Table 6 is inserted around here) 
 
  Table 6 reports the results of Model (1). Column (1) indicates firms with negative 
management forecast errors and column (2) indicates those with equal to or greater than zero 
management forecast errors. The coefficients on ICD (0.128) and RES (0.107) are both positive 
and significant at the 0.10 and the 0.05 levels, respectively, as shown in column (1). On the 
other hand, as shown in column (2) the coefficient on ICD is negative (–0.016), while it is 
insignificant. With respect to RES, the coefficient has an insignificant positive value (0.015). 
These results indicate that firms with weak internal controls report optimistic management 
forecasts and the coefficients are significant at the conventional level. Since the coefficients on 
ICD and RES are not statistically significant in column (2), we interpret that internal control 
weaknesses do not involve pessimistic biases in management forecasts. As in the results shown 
in Table 5, the difference between the coefficients on ICD and RES are significant neither in 
column (1) nor in column (2). Collectively, our results imply that less accurate management 
forecasts by firms with weak internal controls are likely to be induced by their optimistic biases.       
   
7. Conclusion 
In this study, the relationship between the accuracy of management forecasts and the 
  20effectiveness of internal controls was investigated. In Japan, disclosing management forecasts is 
effectively mandated; therefore, we need not control for factors that are likely to influence the 
issuance of forecasts, unlike in other countries such as the U.S. Therefore, the Japanese setting 
allows us to examine the determinants of the accuracy of management forecasts without 
controlling for incentives to disclose such forecasts. 
  Following Feng et al. (2009), we posit that managers of firms with weak internal 
controls are likely to rely on erroneous internal management reports in forming forecasts; 
therefore, their earnings forecasts might be less accurate than those of firms with effective 
internal controls. We shed light on firms disclosing ICD as well as firms restating financial 
highlights, since they have more or less internal control weaknesses. Consistent with the notion 
that firms with weak internal controls report less accurate management forecasts, our results 
indicate that firms disclosing ICD and firms restating financial highlights report less accurate 
management forecasts. Furthermore, we find that a manager’s optimistic bias causes such 
inaccurate management forecasts. While managers are likely to report optimistically biased 
forecast, internal control weaknesses may accelerate such tendencies of management. 
  The limitations of this research include its limited sample period and possible omitted 
variable problems. This study examines only firms having fiscal year end in March 2009; 
therefore, the results may not be generalizable. Moreover, the explanatory power (around 0.30) 
of our regression model is comparable with that of other studies, but it is far from high. There is 
still a room to improve this explanatory power by including additional variables. These issues 
are left for future research. Although there are a few limitations to this study, our findings 
provide new evidence concerning the relationship between the accuracy of management 
forecasts and the effectiveness of internal controls.   
 
  21Appendix: Estimation of Distress Risk 
Following Ota (2006), we employ the principal component method of factor analysis, which is 
suggested by Ohlson (1980), and we calculate the degree of distress risk to estimate Model (1). 
Ohlson (1980) provides a bankruptcy probability model by using nine variables. We use factor 
scores from the first component as a proxy for the degree of financial distress.   
 
(Table A1 is inserted around here) 
 
  Table A1 presents the definition of the variables used in the principal component 
method of factor analysis. The sample period for which we conduct the analysis is from April 
2002 to March 2009. All stock variables, such as liabilities, assets, and cash flows, represent 
mean values during the period. The descriptive statistics and the results of the principal 
component method of factor analysis are shown in Tables A2 and A3, respectively. The factor 
loading sign and the score coefficients of the first principal component are consistent with 
Ohlson (1980) and Ota (2006). Therefore, we interpret that the first principal component in 
Table A3 represents the intensity of financial distress. We then utilize the factor score from the 
first principal component to calculate DIST  in  Model  (1).     
 
(Table A2 and A3 are inserted around here) 
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  25Table 1 Variable Definition 
MFE 
The management earnings forecast error defined as the difference between 
realized earnings of period t + 1 and the management earnings forecast of 
period t + 1 made at the earnings announcement of period t, deflated by the 
market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t. 
Abs(MFE)  The absolute value of the management earnings forecast error 
ICD 
Dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm discloses internal control 
deficiencies and zero otherwise 
RES 
Dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm restates the disclosed 
financial highlights and zero otherwise 
LOSS 
Dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm reports negative net income 
and zero otherwise 
EQUITY 
Dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm issues equity during the 
period 
SIZE  The logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t − 1 
DIST  Ohlson O-score (For details, see Appendix.) 
SD(NI) 
The standard deviation of ROA over the prior 7 years (requiring at least three 
non-missing observations.) 
GROWTH 
The average of sales growth (from t − 1 to t) over the prior 7 years 
(requiring at least three non-missing observations.) 
IND_DIV 
The industry concentration measure defined as the sum of the squares of 
(firm sales in each industry segment/total sales) 
GEO_DIV 
The geographic concentration measure defined as the sum of the squares of 
(firm sales in each geographic segment/total sales) 
lagMFE  The management earnings forecast error in year t − 1 
Abs(lagMFE)  The absolute value of management earnings forecast error in year t − 1 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs.  Mean SD Q1 Median  Q3
MFE  2,214  −0.038  0.224  −0.045  0.001 0.038 
Abs(MFE)  2,214 0.112 0.198 0.014 0.040 0.113 
ICD  2,214 0.023 0.151 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RES  2,214 0.044 0.206 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LOSS  2,214 0.360 0.480 0.000 0.000 1.000 
EQUITY  2,214 0.086 0.280 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIZE  2,214 23.046  1.755 21.789 22.812 24.156 
DIST  2,214  −0.018  0.140  −0.101  −0.034  0.039 
SD(NI)  2,214 0.036 0.045 0.012 0.022 0.041 
GROWTH  2,214 0.050 0.098 0.001 0.031 0.073 
IND_DIV  2,214 0.796 0.255 0.568 0.994 1.000 
GEO_DIV  2,214 0.892 0.196 0.835 1.000 1.000 
lag_MFE  2,214  −0.122  0.207  −0.144  −0.054  −0.012 
lag_ABS(MFE)  2,214 0.131 0.201 0.021 0.059 0.144 
The sample consists of Japanese listed companies having fiscal year end in March 2009. All 
variables are defined in Table 1.Table 3 Correlation Matrix 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14 
MFE  1  1.00  −0.11  −0.08  −0.01  −0.08  −0.02 0.17  −0.04  −0.09 0.12  −0.02  −0.10 0.10  −0.07 
Abs(MFE)  2  −0.72 1.00 0.07 0.10 0.33 0.01  −0.43 0.28 0.34  −0.01 0.13  −0.03  −0.41 0.49 
ICD  3  −0.14 0.14 1.00 0.11 0.09 0.06  −0.08 0.06 0.10  −0.05 0.03 0.01  −0.08 0.09 
RES  4  −0.08 0.13 0.11 1.00 0.10 0.00  −0.08 0.10 0.03  −0.04 0.02  −0.02  −0.09 0.10 
LOSS  5  −0.17 0.31 0.09 0.10 1.00 0.04  −0.20 0.59 0.45  −0.13  −0.02  −0.10  −0.74 0.73 
EQUITY  6  −0.05 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.04 1.00 0.01 0.05 0.14 0.17  −0.04  −0.01  −0.03 0.02 
SIZE  7  0.20  −0.35  −0.09  −0.08  −0.19 0.01 1.00  −0.18  −0.28 0.13  −0.38  −0.36 0.26  −0.34 
DIST  8  −0.23 0.35 0.13 0.13 0.53 0.11  −0.21 1.00 0.20  −0.16  −0.14 0.02  −0.56 0.54 
SD(NI)  9  −0.20 0.28 0.17 0.04 0.34 0.21  −0.27 0.36 1.00 0.07 0.12  −0.09  −0.42 0.49 
GROWTH  10  0.02 0.02  −0.03 0.00  −0.05 0.25 0.01  −0.08 0.22 1.00 0.01  −0.11 0.08  −0.08 
IND_DIV  11  −0.01 0.08 0.03 0.02  −0.02  −0.05  −0.37  −0.09 0.08 0.02 1.00 0.22 0.02 0.03 
GEO_DIV  12  −0.06 0.00 0.01  −0.03  −0.11  −0.01  −0.36 0.03 0.04  −0.01 0.16 1.00 0.17  −0.13 
lag_MFE  13  0.29  −0.46  −0.10  −0.11  −0.60  −0.05 0.30  −0.59  −0.44  −0.02  −0.02 0.04 1.00  −0.90 
ABS(lagMFE)  14  −0.28 0.47 0.11 0.11 0.59 0.05  −0.32 0.58 0.46 0.03 0.04  −0.03  −0.99 1.00 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations are reported in the lower (upper) diagonal. All variables are defined in Table 1.
  28Table 4 Univariate Analysis 
         O b s .         M e a n       M e d i a n  t-stat.(p-value)   z-stat.(p-value)
Total 2,214  0.112  0.040     
non-ICD 2,162  0.107  0.040  −3.355  −3.138 
ICD 52  0.294  0.079  (0.00)  (0.00)
non-RES 2,116  0.106 0.039  −3.646  −4.824 
RES 98  0.231  0.092  (0.00)  (0.00)
This table reports mean and median values of management forecast accuracy for the sample of 
all firms, non-ICD firms (firms that did not disclose ICD), ICD firms (firms that disclosed ICD), 
non-RES firms (firms that did not restate financial highlights), and RES firms (firms that 
restated financial highlights). A two-sample t-test (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) is used to test 
(two-tailed) for significant differences in means (median) between ICD and non-ICD groups as 
well as RES and non-RES groups.     
  29Table 5 Regression Result 
Constant   0.782*** 
   (9.34) 
ICD  (+) 0.097* 
   (1.91) 
RES  (+) 0.059** 
   (2.17) 
LOSS  (+)  −0.001 
   ( −0.049) 
EQUITY  (+) 0.010 
   (0.65) 
SIZE  (–)  −0.029*** 
   ( −10.4) 
DIST  (+) 0.127** 
   (2.05) 
SD(NI)  (+) 0.091 
   (0.61) 
GROW  (+) 0.017 
   (0.26) 
IND_DIV  (–)  −0.021 
   ( −1.22) 
GEO_DIV  (–)  −0.060*** 
   ( −2.67) 
ABS(lagMFE)    (+) 0.286*** 
   (5.69) 
Observations   2214 
Adj. R
2   0.2867 
ICD = RS (F-value)  0.41 
        ( p-value)  (0.52) 
This table reports the parameter estimates and t-statistics from the OLS estimation of Abs(MFE) 
on the ICD dummy, RES dummy, and other control variables. All variables are defined in Table 
1. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level (two-tailed), respectively.   
The t-statistics are based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors and 
covariance. 
 
  30Table 6 Additional Analysis 
  Column (1)  Column (2) 
  MFE < 0  MFE ≥ 0 
Constant   1.021*** 0.465*** 
   (6.74) (8.29) 
ICD  (+) 0.128*  −0.016 
   (1.88)  (−0.55) 
RES  (+) 0.107** 0.015 
   (2.21)  (1.15) 
LOSS  (+) 0.003 0.004 
   (0.18)  (0.49) 
EQUITY  (+) 0.040  −0.010 
   (1.35)  (−1.16) 
SIZE  (–) −0.039***  −0.017*** 
   ( −7.94) (−9.01) 
DIST  (+) 0.213***  −0.019 
   (2.64)  (−0.49) 
SD(NI)  (+) 0.125  −0.090 
   (0.53)  (−0.85) 
GROW  (+) 0.056 0.057* 
   (0.48)  (1.77) 
IND_DIV  (–) −0.029 0.001 
   ( −0.90) (0.11) 
GEO_DIV  (–) −0.068  −0.038*** 
   ( −1.50) (−2.74) 
lagMFE  (+) 0.301*** 0.190*** 
   (4.26)  (5.00) 
Observations   1078  1136 
Adj. R
2   0.3263  0.3031 
ICD = RS    (F-value)  1.68  0.06 
     ( p-value) (0.20)  (0.80) 
This table reports the parameter estimates and t-statistics from the OLS estimation of Abs(MFE) 
on the ICD dummy, RES dummy, and other control variables for the sample of firms with 
negative management forecast errors (Column 1) and firms with equal to or greater than zero 
management forecast errors (Column 2). All variables are defined in Table 1. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level (two-tailed), respectively. The t-statistics 
are based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors and covariance.
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Table A1 Variable Definition for Principle Component Analysis 
TLTA  Total liabilities/Total assets 
WCTA  Working capital/Total assets 
CLCA  Current liabilities/Current assets 
NITA  Net income/Total assets 
FUTL  Operating cash flow/Total liabilities 
INTWO 
Dummy variable that is equal to one if earnings are negative for the last two years   
and zero otherwise   
OENEG 
Dummy variable that is equal to one if total liabilities exceed total assets and zero 
otherwise 
CHIN 
The difference between earnings in t and those in t − 1 divided by the sum of absolute 
value of earnings in t and those in t − 1 
 
 
Table A2 Descriptive Statistics 
  TLTA WCTA  CLCA NITA  FUTL INTWO OENEG  CHIN
N  30,119  30,119 30,119 30,119 30,119 30,119  30,119 30,119 
Mean  0.59  0.13 1.00 0.01 0.09 0.10  0.01 0.01 
SD  2.58  2.57 5.59 0.22 4.24 0.30  0.12 0.56 
p10 0.23  −0.12 0.27  −0.04  −0.05 0.00  0.00  −1.00 
p25  0.37  0.01 0.45 0.00 0.02 0.00  0.00  −0.27 
p50  0.56  0.16 0.70 0.02 0.09 0.00  0.00 0.04 
p75  0.72  0.32 0.99 0.04 0.20 0.00  0.00 0.29 
p90  0.85  0.47 1.49 0.08 0.37 0.00  0.00 0.98 
The sample consists of Japanese listed companies from April 2002 to March 2009. All variables 
are defined in Table A1.Table A3 Result of Principle Component Analysis 
  Factor Loadings Score Coefficients
TLTA  0.950 0.345 
WCTA  −0.950  −0.346 
CLCA  0.838 0.305 
NITA  −0.371  −0.135 
FUTL  −0.009  −0.003 
INTWO  0.131 0.048 
OENEG  0.293 0.107 
CHIN  −0.051  −0.018 
    
Eigenvalue 2.749   
Variation Explained  34.4%  
This table reports the factor loadings and score coefficients of principle component analysis. 
The variables are from Ohlson (1980) and Ota (2006). All variables are defined in Table A1. 
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